ACURA
November 28, 2021
By David C. Speedie
A classic definition of the difference between a politician and a statesman is that, in disagreements with other nations, the latter can understand the position of the other side. This being essential to diplomatic engagement, the speech given by President Putin on November 18 to foreign policy elites in Moscow deserves close attention; indeed, it may be described as an elegy for constructive U.S.-Russia relations.
The tone of President Putin’s presentation was as important as the content: overall, he spoke more in sorrow than in anger [though he did betray a degree of exasperation when speaking of NATO’s expulsion of Russian diplomats]. There was moreover a regret at “missed opportunities” throughout, along with a measured reflection on current stresses in the relationship that contrasts with the hectoring and lecturing approach to Russia from Washington.
That said, this reasonable demeanor should not be confused with any weakness or capitulation: Putin spoke forcefully of red lines, and of the folly of our “superficial” treatment of those [one noticed how he paused for a long moment to find the right word]. The obvious red line of paramount importance is Ukraine; the Minsk Agreements and the deliberations of the Normandy Quartet are mired in the refusal of the two “neutral” observers–France and Germany–to hold Ukraine’s feet to the fire. This is all the more dangerous because, as Putin said starkly: there is no alternative to Minsk. Also complicating matters in a perilous fashion is the fact the the United States seems to be avoiding any direct interventionist role [which the Ukrainians expect, rather like Saakashvili did with disastrous consequences in Georgia in 2008] by, providing high-grade weaponry to Kiev–a consolation prize that since the 2014 coup amounts to some $2.5 billion, including such sophisticated items as electronic warfare equipment. The latest tranche of $150 million also seems to include U.S. training personnel at Ukrainian air bases. From NATO, there has come Turkish war drones, those which killed 6000 people in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. This military largess has emboldened Kiev not merely to stall on the Minsk accords, but to threaten violation [the most recent buildup of Russian troops on the eastern border was in response to Ukrainian threats to attack the cities of Donetsk and Lukansk, which are inside the buffer zone established by MInsk in 2015.] Finally, in his visit to Kiev on October 18, US Defense Secretary Austin reaffirmed our support for eventual Ukrainian membership in NATO {the reddest of lines for Russia.] All this begs the question: what is the national interest for the United States in Ukraine, other than to stoke Russian neuralgia?

