ACURA
November 28, 2021
By David C. Speedie

A classic definition of the difference between a politician and a statesman is that, in disagreements with other nations, the latter can understand the position of the other side.  This being essential to diplomatic engagement, the speech given by President Putin on November 18 to foreign policy elites in Moscow deserves close attention; indeed, it may be described as an elegy for constructive U.S.-Russia relations.

The tone of President Putin’s presentation was as important as the content: overall, he spoke more in sorrow than in anger [though he did betray a degree of exasperation when speaking of NATO’s expulsion of Russian diplomats].  There was moreover a regret at “missed opportunities” throughout, along with a measured reflection on current stresses in the relationship that contrasts with the hectoring and lecturing approach to Russia from Washington.

That said, this reasonable demeanor should not be confused with any weakness or capitulation: Putin spoke forcefully of red lines, and of the folly of our “superficial” treatment of those [one noticed how he paused for a long moment to find the right word].  The obvious red line of paramount importance is Ukraine; the Minsk Agreements and the deliberations of the Normandy Quartet are mired in the refusal of the two “neutral” observers–France and Germany–to hold Ukraine’s feet to the fire.  This is all the more dangerous because, as Putin said starkly: there is no alternative to Minsk.  Also complicating matters in a perilous fashion is the fact the the United States seems to be avoiding any direct interventionist role [which the Ukrainians expect, rather like Saakashvili did with disastrous consequences in Georgia in 2008] by, providing high-grade weaponry to Kiev–a consolation prize that since the 2014 coup amounts to some $2.5 billion, including such sophisticated items as electronic warfare equipment.  The latest tranche of $150 million also seems to include U.S. training personnel at Ukrainian air bases.  From NATO, there has come Turkish war drones, those which killed 6000 people in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh.  This military largess has emboldened Kiev not merely to stall on the Minsk accords, but to threaten violation [the most recent buildup of Russian troops on the eastern border was in response to Ukrainian threats to attack the cities of Donetsk and Lukansk, which are inside the buffer zone established by MInsk in 2015.]  Finally, in his visit to Kiev on October 18, US Defense Secretary Austin reaffirmed our support for eventual Ukrainian membership in NATO {the reddest of lines for Russia.]  All this begs the question: what is the national interest for the United States in Ukraine, other than to stoke Russian neuralgia?

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“Vladimir the Terrible”

Fits the Needs of the U.S. Military-Industrial Complex
for an “Evil Foreign Enemy”—

But the Real Putin Is Well-Regarded by Many Russians for Standing Up to
U.S. Imperialism and Reviving the Russian Economy

CovertAction Magazine
November 26, 2021
By Danny Shaw

Putin is considered a threat because he restored Russian sovereignty, erased the humiliation of the Boris Yeltsin era, and championed Russia’s national interests. But that is just what the U.S. elite could not tolerate.

The U.S. military-industrial complex needs enemies like human lungs need oxygen. When there are no enemies, they must be invented.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pentagon spin doctors had to search for a new bogeyman to justify their immense $778 billion budget, and its crippling effect on the U.S. economy. If that meant creating a propaganda campaign to paint Panama President Manuel Noriega—a longtime CIA asset—as a mad-dog “threat to American democracy” in order to justify the 1989 invasion of Panama (whose dead have yet to all be counted 32 years later)—well, so be it.

Or if it meant that other CIA assets, like Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, also had to be painted as dangerous threats to American democracy to justify the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, at the cost of countless Iraqi and Afghan lives, not to mention the lives of the thousands of gullible U.S. soldiers who served as cannon fodder—well, so be that, too.But once those enemies were gone, a new one was needed. And almost as if on cue, the re-emergence of a strong, sovereign Russia in 1999 provided the ideal candidate. It also provided a perfect excuse to initiate a new Cold War, which would justify the ever-increasing expenditures for exotic weaponry that the military-industrial complex kept demanding from its bought-and-paid-for politicians in the White House and Congress.

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Natylie’s Place: Understanding Russia
November 22, 2021
By Natylie Baldwin

When the Berlin Wall came down, many triumphantly declared that the West had won the Cold War and that its values would soon become universally accepted, pushing out the old systems that had dominated Eastern Europe for decades.

However, more than thirty years on and it is clear that Russians are in no hurry to emulate the liberal systems of countries like the US. One poll, released last month, revealed that nearly half of Russians say they don’t hold democratic values. Many Western pundits would quickly blame this on President Vladimir Putin, who they accuse of crushing their hopes for the country after the fall of communism, transforming it into a hybrid capitalist state. But why are so many Russians skeptical of the West’s promises in the first place?

There was indeed a honeymoon period immediately following the end of the Cold War when a huge majority of Russians viewed the US and its institutions favorably, and were open to the kind of democracy being touted from abroad. It’s not well understood how Russians ended up becoming disillusioned to the point where many of them now refer to democracy as “sh*tocracy.”  The answer to the question requires one to take an unflinching look at the Russian experience of the 1990’s.

Jack Matlock, the US ambassador to Russia during the Bush administration, explained that after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the country was wracked by “runaway inflation that destroyed all savings, even worse shortages of essential goods than existed under communism, a sudden rise in crime and a government that, for several years was unable to pay even [its] miserable pensions on time.  Conditions resembled anarchy much more than life in a modern democracy.”

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